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In November 2008, leading scholars at the London School 
of  Economics were posed a question which they, as a 
profession, are still struggling to answer five years later. 
The interlocutor was Queen Elizabeth II, making only 
the second visit by a reigning monarch to the university 
since its foundation. The topic was the credit crunch 
and financial crisis. Her Majesty’s question was how it 
was possible that nobody, including the august economic 
experts assembled, had seen the crisis coming  [1]. The 
Queen was not alone in wondering whether the failure to 
predict the defining economic episode of  our generation 
reveals more fundamental problems within the discipline. 
Dissenting voices in the academy and beyond have begun 
to challenge some of  the discipline’s received wisdoms in 
the light of  the crash, calling for greater pluralism and 
reflexivity. The status of  economics both within academia 
as the most rigorous and scientific of  the social or ‘soft’ 
sciences; and as a guide to action in the field of  public 
policy is being questioned to a degree not experienced for 
some decades.  
Five years on from the Queen’s question, the Sveriges 
Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences (better known as the 
Nobel Prize for Economics, despite its sponsorship by the 
Swedish central bank), was awarded to Professor Eugene 
Fama. Both Fama and his employer, the University of  
Chicago, are strongly associated with economic positions 
that not only failed to predict, or to adequately explain, the 
financial crash and its consequences, but were arguably 
implicated in producing it. Economics, in common with 
broader financial and political systems, seemed to have 
absorbed the impact of  the crisis and reverted to business 
as usual.
Yet there may still be a threat to the continued dominance 
of  economics. The immanent critique of  economics from 
within the academy has not been silenced and may still 
effect some change, although it must surmount major 
institutional obstacles to do so.  But running parallel to 
calls for an overhaul of  academic economics’ curricula 
and research priorities, there may be an even stronger 
challenge to the dominance of  economics as a source of  
policy advice. While most attention has been focused on 
demands for an economic perestroika in academia that 
would open up the mainstream to new approaches, it 
is policy-makers’ increasing interest in developments in 
behavioural and neurological science that may present 
the true existential threat to the dominance of  economics. 
In 1989, the academic field of  international relations 
suffered a similar crisis as the one that now confronts 
economics. Rational and objective strategic studies often 
based on applying economic principles, had dominated 
the field and brought international relations scholars to a 
prominent position in defence and security policy. Yet for 
all the elegance and complexity of  the models produced 
by these scholars, they were unable to predict or explain 
the fall of  the Soviet Union and the end of  the Cold 
War. The reaction to this failure within the discipline was 
significant. With many of  its most basic assumptions being 
tested and found wanting in the light of  the changing 
world situation, a more critical, self-reflective approach to 
security emerged, prepared to challenge the boundaries 
of  the field and re-imagine the concept of  security and 
the state itself. Yet despite the broadening and deepening 
of  the understanding of  security in academia, a relatively 
narrow understanding of  security continued to dominate 
in the world of  policy. Security scholars working in non-
traditional paradigms became ever more detached from 
the practice of  security. 
The call for economics to undergo a similar bout of  self-
examination has been increasing in volume in recent 
years, as demonstrated by the protests of  Manchester 
students at the narrowness of  university economics 
curricula [2], and the formation of  groups such as the 
Cambridge Society for Economic Pluralism [3] and 
Sheffield’s Political Economy Research Institute (SPERI) 
[4]. Yet the consequences of  such introspection may well 
repeat the experience of  those who undertook the same 
task in the field of  international security. Undoubtedly, 
the intellectual case for incorporating insights drawn 
from other social sciences such as psychology, history 
and sociology is strong. The LSE economists’ response 
to the Queen’s question is essentially a restatement of  
the limits of  economics, and the need for a fuller account 
of  human psychology and motivation than the stylised 
heuristics provided in economic models can generate [5]. 
The intellectual integrity of  the subject would seem to be 
clearly enhanced by greater openness to the perspectives 
of  other social sciences and an acceptance that economics 
cannot deliver all the answers. Yet while a more plural 
and modest outlook may enhance economics’ intellectual 
integrity, this does not necessarily translate into greater 
practical relevance in the policy world, as the example 
of  security studies demonstrates. The result may in 
fact be the opposite, with the emergence of  a strong 
heterodox stream in academic economics but relatively 
little challenge to the established tradition in the field of  
policy advice. 
Understanding this apparent paradox requires 
understanding the function of  economic analysis in the 
policy process. The reason that economics has occupied 
a privileged position in policy advice is because it supplies 
a product that consumers are demanding. Economics 
promises to resolve value questions laden with emotion 
and conflict into questions capable of  resolution by 
neutral, technical means. It promises to turn complex 
issues into simpler ones by assigning symbols that can be 
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measured against one another in a common currency. 
Economics offers to policy-makers the imaginary 
resolution of  social conflict and contradiction. In short, it 
promises to make policy-makers’ lives simpler. 
To take one example, in deciding whether to proceed with 
a high speed rail project, policy-makers want to know how 
much contribution they will get to GDP in exchange for 
how much outlay in capital spending now. They are likely 
to be less interested in hearing about the intractability 
of  collective action problems, the impact of  social norms 
and peer effects, the cognitive biases against appropriate 
discounting of  the future, the historical comparison with 
the Beeching reforms or the philosophical quandaries 
engendered by the requirements of  intergenerational 
justice. These only make the problem more complex, even 
if  they may provide a fuller understanding of  the issue in all 
relevant dimensions. Economics provides policy-makers 
with a starting point capable of  guiding action that seems 
to circumvent difficult questions of  value and principle 
in favour of  a consideration of  a universally agreed good 
of  obtaining value for money. To criticise economic 
analyses of  policy problems as incomplete because they 
ignore relevant ethical or sociological considerations is 
to miss the point. Policy-makers are always required to 
operate with incomplete information. Canvassing the 
full spectrum of  social science perspectives on any policy 
question is likely to produce findings too tentative and 
qualified to serve as a basis for action or the selection of  
a particular policy option. In this case, more information 
means more inertia. The powerful appeal of  economics 
is that it is the only social science discipline that promises 
to make decision making easier for policy-makers and 
problems less complex. This is an important part of  the 
reason why mainstream approaches to economics have 
survived the Asian crisis, why they survived the tech 
bubble and why they will survive the crash as well. The 
call for greater pluralism may be intellectually correct, 
but it risks consigning any who follow that advice to 
irrelevance in policy terms. 
Economic overconfidence is not a flaw from the 
perspective of  its dominance in public policy, it is its 
USP. The more modest, self-critical and less confident 
an academic discipline is, the more it takes seriously the 
possibility of  error, uncertainty and the contestability of  
its most basic assumptions, the less likely it is to be sought 
out to support policy-making. Hence why it is economics, 
and not psychology, anthropology, sociology or above all 
philosophy to which policy-makers will often turn. Those 
social sciences that are making inroads are precisely those 
that extend the possibility of  certainty. The dominance of  
economics as a source of  policy advice will be overthrown 
when behavioural science or neuroscience reaches the 
stage of  development where it can plausibly claim to 
make policy-makers lives easier and less complex. Policy-
makers current enthusiasm for behavioural psychology 
(‘nudging’) and randomised controlled trials modelled 
on epidemiology rather than economics demonstrates 
the truth of  this proposition. The future of  policy advice 
may be not economic, but rather based on behavioural 
genetics, as endorsed in the field of  education by close 
advisers to the Secretary of  State [6], or endocrinological 
studies such as those conducted on the effects of  hormones 
on City traders’ behaviour [7]. Already, evolutionary 
biologists, psychologists and neuroscientists have 
discovered systematic biases in human rationality and 
irrationality that challenge the fundamental assumptions 
and models on which economics has been built. The more 
we know about these things, the less useful are economists’ 
simplifying assumptions about human motivation and 
decision making. These approaches are marginal to 
policy at present, yet they may represent a real challenge 
to the position of  economics as they develop. There is an 
emerging demand from policy-makers for a replacement 
for economics that offers the same unchallengeable basis 
in hard science combined with the capacity for reducing 
the range of  factors that must be considered when 
formulating policy. And as any good economist will know, 
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